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INTRODUCTION 
 “If you’ve been sexually harassed or assaulted write ‘me too’ as a reply to this tweet.”1 
As hundreds of thousands of people began posting #MeToo, the significant social movement 
shed light on the prevalence of sexual harassment in the workplace.2 #MeToo has exposed the 
gaps in sexual harassment legislation, and mobilized support for protective lawmaking at both 
the state and federal level.3 Section 703(a)(2) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes 
it unlawful for an employer “to discriminate against any individual with respect to his 
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, 
color, religion, sex, or national origin." 4  In 1980, the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (“EEOC”) amended its guidelines to include sexual harassment as a form of sex 
discrimination prohibited by Title VII.5  Sexual harassment under Title VII is actionable because 
of its discriminatory nature against protected classes.6  There are two types of harassment 
recognized under Title VII, including quid pro quo and hostile work environment.7  This 
comment will focus on hostile work environment claims.8  To make a prima facie case of a 
hostile work environment, the victim must show that: (1) they belong to a protected class under 
the law; (2) the harassment experienced was based on sex; (3) the harassment was unwelcome; 
 
1 Alyssa Milano (@Alyssa_Milano), TWITTER (Oct. 15, 2017, 1:21PM),   
https://twitter.com/Alyssa_Milano/status/919659438700670976.  
2 See Brianna Messina, REDEFINING REASONABLENESS: SUPERVISORY HARASSMENT CLAIMS IN THE ERA 
OF # METOO, 168 U. PA. L. REV. 1061, 1061-64 (2020) (discussing the effects of the #metoo movement on 
reporting and awareness of workplace harassment). 
3 Messina, supra note 2, at 1087. 
4 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). 
5 Policy Guidance on Current Issues of Sexual Harassment, U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, 
https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance/policy-guidance-current-issues-sexual-harassment.  
6 Anna I. Burke, "It Wasn't That Bad": The Necessity of Social Framework Evidence in Use of the Reasonable 
Woman Standard, 105 IOWA L. REV. 771, 775 (2019) (the conduct must result in sex discrimination). 
7 See Rachel Farkas, et al., State Regulation of Sexual Harassment, 20 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 421, 436 (2019) (quid 
pro quo harassment occurs when the “submission to or rejection of” requests for sexual favors “is used as the basis 
for employment decisions affecting” an individual.”). 
8 See Farkas et al., supra note 7, at 427 (discussing the types of claims actionable under Title VII ). 
(4) the harassment must be sufficiently severe or pervasive "to alter the conditions of [the 
victim's] employment and create an abusive working environment;" and that the plaintiff 
subjectively and a reasonable person would also objectively view the work environment as 
hostile or abusive.9  While the “severe or pervasive” standard has long governed hostile work 
environment claims both under Title VII and in many state legislative counterparts, the #metoo 
movement has sparked a movement in favor of softening this hard standard.10  For example, in 
2018, California amended its anti-discrimination law to allow a lower threshold for bringing a 
hostile work environment claim.11  In 2019, Governor Andrew Cuomo similarly signed into law 
anti-sexual harassment legislation that allows for workers to bring harassment suits resulting 
from conduct that in the past would not likely satisfy the "severe or pervasive" burden.12  These 
developments are overdue, but only provide additional protections for citizens within these 
states, and are often not retroactive.13  Moreover, many state courts continue to ignore these 
modifications, blindly applying the old standard.14  
 The “severe or pervasive” standard is outdated and inefficient.15  States should follow 
the footsteps of New York and California and adopt a more inclusive standard that recognizes all 
 
9 Farkas et al., supra note 7; see also Christine J. Back & Wilson C. Freeman, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R45155, 
SEXUAL HARASSMENT AND TITLE VII: SELECTED LEGAL ISSUES 2-3 (2018). 
10 See generally PROGRESS IN ADVANCING ME TOO WORKPLACE REFORMS IN #20STATESBY2020, NAT’L WOMEN’S 
LAW CTR. (2019), https://nwlc.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/final_2020States_Report-12.20.19-v2.pdf.  
11 Nat’l Women’s Law Ctr., supra note 10, at 10. 
12 Nat’l Women’s Law Ctr., supra note 10, at 10.  
13 See, e.g., Wellner v. Montefiore Med. Ctr., No. 17 Civ. 3479 (KPF), 2019 WL 4081898, at *5 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 
29, 2019) (holding that the bill’s effective date is October 11, 2019). 
14 See Ramit Mizrahi, Sexual Harassment Law After #MeToo: Looking to California as a Model , 128 YALE L.J. F. 
121, 126 (2018). 
15 See A Call for Legislative Action to Eliminate Workplace Harassment: Principles and Priorities , AM. CIV. 
LIBERTIES UNION 3, 
https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/workplace_harassment_legislative_principles_10.15.18.pdf  
(last visited April 15, 2021) (proposing that congress should “[a]ddress the judicially created “severe or pervasive” 
liability standard so as to correct and prevent unduly restrictive interpretations by the courts that minimize and 
ignore the impact of harassment.”). 
forms of sexual harassment as punishable.16  Many are skeptical of sexual harassment claims 
until they fall victim to an offenders wrongdoing. This skepticism blocks the path to relief for 
victims, as their experiences are belittled by judges who quantify the victims suffering based off 
of an employer-friendly standard. This distrust of victims discourages reporting, which in turn 
authorizes the harasser’s impunity.  All of these factors support the desperate need for a standard 
that recognizes all instances of harassment as such. Without this modification, victims’ careers 
will continue to suffer, harassers will continue to harass without penalty, and any progress made 
in light of #metoo in the realm of sexual harassment law will go to waste.   
 Part I of this comment addresses the current “severe or pervasive” standard set out in 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson,17 and the development of 
sexual harassment law in recent decades.  Part II examines state modifications of this standard, 
incorporating cases that likely would have been decided differently had the stringent “severe or 
pervasive” requirement been abolished.  Part III analyzes the implementation of these reformed 
thresholds, addressing emerging case law that apply less  onerous standards than the traditional 
Meritor standard. Here, I argue that state modifications, though a significant improvement in 
sexual harassment law, are still not inclusive enough, and that a binding, plaintiff-friendly federal 
standard is necessary to protect victims. Accordingly, I conclude that the Federal Bringing an 
End to Harassment by Enhancing Accountability and Rejecting Discrimination in the Workplace 
Act (“BE HEARD”)18, proposed in Congress but ultimately rejected, should be pursued again 
because it better encompasses problematic behavior that continues to serve as a barrier to 
victim’s advancement. By setting a threshold that allows for less judicial deference, case law 
 
16 See generally Cal. Gov't Code § 12923; N.Y. Exec. Law § 296.  
17 See 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986). 
18 Bringing an End to Harassment by Enhancing Accountability and Rejecting Discrimination in the Workplace Act, 
H.R. 2148, 116 th Cong. §204(a)(5) (2019). 
governing hostile work environment claims will become more uniform, and harassers will be 
held accountable for their unpardonable acts. 
I. The History of the Severe or Pervasive Standard 
The laws and systems currently in place to address harassment are inadequate. Sexual 
harassment does not have to be “sexual.”19  It can include conduct of a sexual nature, such as 
requests for sexual favors or unwanted verbal or physical sexual advances and can occur 
regardless of whether the harasser claims to be sexually attracted to the victim.20  Moreover, 
women are not the only victims, as men, particularly those who don’t conform to masculine 
norms, can be targets.21  Women can also be harassers.22  However, it is well recognized that 
women are especially susceptible to sexual harassment; despite under-reporting, approximately 
60% of female employees have experienced at least one instance of sexually harassing behavior, 
such as unwanted sexual attention or sexual coercion.23 
In Meritor, plaintiff, Mechelle Vinson, an employee at Meritor Savings Bank, was fired 
from her position for “excessive use” of sick leave.24 Vinson brought an action against Meritor 
 
19 See Kristen N. Colleta,  Sexual Harassment on Social Media: Why Traditional Company Sexual Harassment 
Policies are Not Enough and How to Fix It, 48 SETON HALL L. REV. 449, 450 (2018) (“For example, ‘offensive 
remarks about a person's sex’ can result in a sexual harassment claim.”); see also Judith J. Johnson, License To 
Harass Women: Requiring Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment To Be "Severe Or Pervasive" Discriminates 
Among "Terms And Conditions" Of Employment , 62 MD. L. REV. 85, 135 (2003) (“The other type of sexual 
harassment does not involve sexual conduct, but rather would cover such conduct as derogatory comments about a 
person's gender.”). 
20 Combating Sexual Harassment in the Workplace: Trends and Recommendations Based o n 2017 Public Hearing 
Testimony, New York City Commission on Human Rights, at 2 (2017). 
21 Aleiza Durana et al., SEXUAL HARASSMENT: A SEVERE AND PERVASIVE PROBLEM (Sep. 2018),  
http://newamericadotorg.s3.amazonaws.com/documents/Sexual_Harassment_A_Severe_and_Pervasive_Problem_2
018-09-25_152914.pdf.  
22 See Ramya Sekaran, Congress Finally Introduces Groundbreaking Workplace Harassment Legislation For the 
Rest of Us, NAT’L WOMEN’S LAW CTR. (April 9, 2019), https://nwlc.org/blog/congress-finally-introduces-
groundbreaking-workplace-harassment-legislation-for-the-rest-of-us/ (recognizing that while workers in virtually 
every industry experience harassment and discrimination, low wage works and women in male-dominated fields are 
especially vulnerable). 
23 Combating Sexual Harassment in the Workplace: Trends and Recommendations Based on 2017 Public Hearing 
Testimony, supra note 20. 
24 Meritor, 477 U.S. at 60. 
Savings Bank, and the bank’s Vice President, Sidney Taylor, claiming that Taylor sexually 
harassed her on multiple occasions throughout her four-year term of employment.25 Vinson 
testified that the first instance of harassment occurred when Taylor invited her out to dinner and 
pressured her to have sexual relations, which she agreed to out of fear of losing her job. 
Following this incident, Vinson further alleged that Taylor repeatedly demanded sexual favors, 
“fondled her in front of other employees, followed her into the women's restroom when she went 
there alone, exposed himself to her, and even forcibly raped her on several occasions.”26  Vinson 
did not report this misconduct out of fear of Taylor and of termination.27 Taylor denied all 
allegations and suggested that the action was a response to a business-related dispute.28 The 
District court denied relief, finding that any sexual activity between the pair was voluntary and 
that Vinson therefore could not be a victim of sexual harassment.29 However, the Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed the District Court’s ruling and remanded 
the case, holding that if the evidence demonstrated that "’Taylor made Vinson's toleration of 
sexual harassment a condition of her employment,’" her voluntariness was not material, and that 
Vinson raised a valid claim under Title VII predicated on the existence of a hostile work 
environment. 30 The Supreme Court recognized that a hostile work environment violates Title 
VII,31 and affirmed the circuit court’s holding, recognizing that Vinson raised a sufficient claim 
for hostile work environment sexual harassment because Taylor’s actions constituted pervasive 




27 Id. at 61. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. 
30 Meritor, 477 U.S at 62. 
31 Id. at 64 (the Court specified that “sexual harassment,” is a form of sex discrimination prohibited by Title VII). 
32 Id. at 66-67 (“plaintiff may establish a violation of Title VII by proving that discrimination based on sex has 
created a hostile or abusive work environment.”). 
violate Title VII only when the harassment is “sufficiently severe or pervasive enough to alter 
the conditions of employment and create an abusive work environment.”33   
After the Supreme Court recognized a cause of action to redress hostile work 
environment claims, the Court continued to clarify the standard.34  For example, seven years 
after Meritor, the Court in  Harris v. Forklift Systems, expanded the definition of a 
discriminatorily hostile work environment by specifying the types of injury sufficient to support 
a claim.35 The case involved a claim raised by Teresa Harris, a manager at Forklift Systems, who 
faced gender-based insults and unwanted sexual innuendos.36  Specifically, Forklift’s Systems 
President, Hardy, made derogatory comments towards Harris multiple times, such as “‘you’re a 
woman, what do you know’, and ‘dumb ass woman.”37  Harris complained to Hardy about his 
conduct and was assured that he would stop, but the verbal harassment continued until she quit 
the job.38  Harris then brought an action asserting that Hardy’s conduct created a hostile work 
environment.39 
The District Court held that although it was "a close case,” Hardy's conduct did not create 
an abusive environment because it “’did not create a working environment so poisoned as to be 
intimidating or abusive’” to Harris.40  There, the court found that while some of Hardy's 
comments "offended [Harris], and would offend the reasonable woman,” they were not "so 
severe as to be expected to seriously affect [Harris'] psychological well-being,” nor sufficient to 
 
33 Id.; see also L. Camille Hébert, Is “MeToo” Only a Social Movement or a Legal Movement Too?, 22 EMPL. RTS. 
& EMPLOY. POL 'Y J. 321, 330 (“the Severe or Pervasive standard was enacted to make sure that claims of 
harassment represented real harm to claimants, as well as to distinguish between what the Court viewed as merely 
‘offensive’ behavior and behavior that was ‘abusive.’”). 
34 See Johnson, supra note 19, at 98. 
35 510 U.S. 17, 20 (1993). 
36 Id. at 19. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. at 31. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. at 20 
interfere with a reasonable person’s work performance.41  The Supreme Court later held that the 
district court erred, holding that it was improper for the District Court to solely rely upon the 
presence of psychological injury, and that instead all circumstances must be considered when 
determining whether an environment is hostile.42  The Court reaffirmed the “severe or pervasive” 
standard, noting that it “takes a middle path between making actionable any conduct that is 
merely offensive and requiring the conduct to cause a tangible psychological injury.”43 The 
Court  also dismissed the notion that analyzing hostile work environment claims can be “a 
mathematically precise test.”44 Courts cannot apply generalized factors when analyzing sexual 
harassment claims because each victim’s experience is individualized - instead, there must be a 
holistic analysis of each distinct claim.45   
Justice Ginsburg concurred in Harris, agreeing that the court’s inquiry should center on 
“whether the discriminatory conduct has unreasonably interfered with the plaintiff's work 
performance.” However, in her opinion, she highlights that the plaintiff need not individually 
prove that their tangible productivity has declined, but instead that it “suffices to prove that a 
reasonable person subjected to the discriminatory conduct would find . . . that the harassment so 
altered working conditions as to make it more difficult to do the job.”46  
The majority in Harris further explained that the standard of review is both objective and 
subjective, meaning that courts must consider how the harasser’s behavior would be viewed by a 
 
41 Harris, 510 U.S. at 20.  
42 Id. at 23. 
43 Id. a t 21 (“Psychological harm, like any other relevant factor, may be taken into account”, but no single factor is 
required). 
44 Id.  
45 See Farkas, supra note 7, at 451 (citing 29 C.F.R. 1604.11(b)) (“Because of the subjective nature of these terms, 
the EEOC guidelines recommend that courts assess the totality of the circumstances to determine whether there was 
severity or pervasiveness based on individual facts of a case.”).  
46 Harris, 510 U.S at 26. 
reasonable person, as well as how the harasser’s behavior was individually viewed by the 
plaintiff.47   The Court further instructed that when assessing the objective portion of a plaintiff's 
claim, courts assume the perspective of the reasonable victim.48 Following Harris, lower courts 
typically apply the standard of review proposed by the Court, however some courts stray from 
this standard and instead apply a reasonable woman standard.49  The Supreme Court has not 
clarified which standard should be invoked when analyzing the objective component of a hostile 
work environment claim.50 
The Seventh Circuit’s decision in Swyear v. Fare Foods Corp demonstrates the dangers 
of the objective component of the analysis, as while an employee testified that she found the 
environment at her workplace to be sexist and offensive, the court held that the workplace as a 
whole was not sufficiently severe or pervasive. 51 Throughout the course of her employment, 
Amy Swyear was subjected to an unprofessional environment.52  On July 15, 2015, Swyear met 
Russell Scott, an outside sales representative, at a county fair to meet with customers.53  After 
completing work at the fair, Swyear was forced to stay with Scott for “additional training,” and 
reserved two separate rooms in a hotel. 54 Scott repeatedly touched Swyear's arm, placed his 
 
47 Farkas, supra note 7, at 451; see also Back, supra note 9, at 9-10 (“the plaintiff subjectively viewed the 
harassment as creating an abusive work environment; and a ‘reasonable’ person would also objectively view the 
work environment as abusive. This last objective prong typically constitutes the most probing aspect of the 
analysis.”).  
48 Brooks v. City of San Mateo, 229 F.3d 917, 924 (9th Cir. 2000); see also Policy Guidance on Current Issues of 
Sexual Harassment, supra note 5 (noting that a  "reasonable person" standard also should be applied to be more basic 
determination of whether challenged conduct is of a sexual nature). 
49 Burke, supra note 6, at 774. But see Policy Guidance on Current Issues of Sexual Harassment , supra note 5. 
(supporting that shifting to a reasonable woman standard is unnecessary because “the” reasonable person standard 
should consider the victim's perspective and not stereotyped notions of acceptable behavior).  
50 See Burke, supra note 6, at 781 (in Harris, the Supreme Court used a reasonable person standard to determine the 
objective hostility of a work environment. Following Harris, some lower courts modified the inquiry  depending on 
who the reasonable person in question was due to gendered perceptions of sexual harassment. The Supreme Court 
has not yet rejected the use of the reasonable woman standard for Title VII cases).  
51 See generally 911 F.3d 874 (7th Cir. 2018). 
52 Id. a t 877.  
53 Id. a t 879. 
54 Id. a t 879. 
hand on her lower back, and stood close.55 Scott had three beers during dinner and told Swyear 
several times that he was single, and later demonstrated signs of intoxication as a result of the 
drinks.56 Upon arriving at their rooms Scott made his way into Swyear's room, and crawled into 
Swyear's bed and asked her to be a "cuddle buddy".57 Despite declining and asking Scott to 
leave, he returned and knocked on Swyear's door multiple times.58 Shortly after returning, 
Swyear reported the incident to her superior, who decided that no discipline was warranted; 
Swyear was eventually terminated.59 
After the court granted Fare Food’s motion for summary judgment, Swyear appealed to 
the Seventh Circuit, which determined that in considering the objective offensiveness of a work 
environment, courts should consider “the severity of the conduct, its frequency, whether it is 
merely offensive as opposed to physically threatening or humiliating, and whether it 
unreasonably interfered with an employee's work performance.”60 The court reasoned that 
Swyear failed to establish that Scott’s conduct was objectively offensive because the conduct 
was merely “crude and immature” rather than pervasively hostile.61 The court here clearly erred, 
as while the weighed factors may indicate that the environment as a whole is not hostile, this is 
clearly sexual harassment. This decision is reflective of the gaps in the federal system, as judges 
continue to belittle a victim’s experience by determining that claims aren’t harmful enough.   
While the federal scheme appropriately recognizes an objective consideration of a plaintiff’s 




57 Swyear, 911 F.3d at 879. 
58 Id. 
59 Id.  
60 Id. a t 881. 
61 Id. (“Although we recognize the environment at Fare Foods was at times inappropriate and offensive, we do not 
believe [plaintiff] has met [the severe or pervasive standard].”). 
considered objectively offensive to one judge is not to another, which is why I encourage the 
adoption of uniform guidelines that embody a lower threshold.  
But notwithstanding which standard courts apply, conduct that is not severe or pervasive 
enough to create an objectively hostile or abusive work environment is beyond the scope of Title 
VII.62  When faced with conduct that does not meet that rigid standard, many courts have used 
the stringent language to effectively deem harmful conduct permissible.63  For example, a 
supervisor raping an employee has, perhaps not surprisingly, consistently been viewed as 
“severe” enough to meet the bar even if based upon a single crime. However, in other instances a 
single incident does not meet the threshold, such as when physical contact is not “bad” enough, 
or if the action does not involve physical threats.64  Yet, a wide range of other problematic and 
harmful conduct often does not meet either threshold, such as if a supervisor asks an employee 
out on a date once and treats her differently if she declines.65 Accordingly, an abusive work 
environment, even one that does not impact psychological well-being, “can and often will detract 
from employees' job performance, discourage employees from remaining on the job, or keep 
them from advancing in their careers,” and therefore should fall within Title VII’s purview.66 
 
62 Brooks, 229 F.3d at 924.  
63 See Johnson, supra note 19, at 86; see also Sandra F. Sperino & Suja A. Thomas, Boss Grab your Breasts? That’s 
not (Legally) Harassment, N.Y TIMES, Nov. 29, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/29/opinion/harassment-
employees-laws-.html ; Back, supra note 9, at 3 (“Failure to show sufficient severity or pervasiveness, under the 
objective prong of the analysis, is often the basis for dismissal of a Title VII harassment claim .”). 
64 See, e.g. Paul v. Northrop Grumman Ship Sys., 309 F. App'x 825, 826 (5th Cir. 2009) (Affirming a district court 
ruling that a single incident of a male foreman going chest to chest with a female plaintiff and rubbing pelvic region 
across her hips and buttocks and la sting some 90 seconds and buttocks was not sufficiently severe or pervasive to 
constitute an actionable Title VII claim); Guerrero v. Lowe's Home Ctrs., Inc., 254 F. App'x 865, 867 (2d Cir. 2007) 
(“where the sex-related conduct complained of was principally name calling, no single incident was sufficiently 
severe to give rise to a cause of action . . . [w]e think it important . . . that Guerrero alleges no physical touching or 
threats, no interference with her work performance, and no overt sexual advances. If she proffered evidence to 
support a finding that she had suffered that sort of harassment, the analysis as to whether it was severe or pervasive 
might well be different.”). 
65 Sperino & Thomas, supra note 63; see also Policy Guidance on Current Issues of Sexual Harassment , supra note 
5 (“A ‘hostile environment’ claim generally requires a showing of a pattern of offensive conduct .”). 
66 Policy Guidance on Current Issues of Sexual Harassment , supra note 5. 
The problem with the federal scheme is that it continues to dismiss improper conduct in 
the name of not meeting the threshold. When conduct is rendered not serious enough to meet the 
standard, victims are left without a remedy. Harassers misconduct cannot continue to be pushed 
under the rug and excused, and the federal system fails to encompass a wide variety of 
harassment that harm women. Women are forced to either leave their positions to evade their 
harassers or must work in an environment that is not conducive to their success and 
advancement.  The standard is far too preclusive, as it minimizes bad behavior under the guise of 
outdated understandings of  professionalism and workplace interactions.  
 
II. State Modifications 
Many state courts have looked to Title VII and its interpretations when determining the 
validity of hostile work environment claims under state antidiscrimination law.67  However, 
states like California and New York have gone beyond the federal standard and enacted 
legislation that employs greater protections for victims of sexual harassment.68  In January of 
2019, the California legislature enacted Section 12923 of its antidiscrimination code to declare 
its intent regarding the application of the laws about harassment.69 There, the Legislature 
expressly states that a “single incident of harassing conduct” may be sufficient to create a triable 
issue regarding the existence of a hostile work environment.70  If the harassing conduct interferes 
with the employee’s work performance or creates “an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working 
environment[,]” then an employee may pursue a valid sexual harassment claim.71  California’s 
 
67 Carol Schultz Vento, When is Work Environment Intimidating, Hostile or Offensive, so as to Constitute Sexual 
Harassment Under State Law, 93 A.L.R.5th 47, 2 (2021).  
68 See Cal. Gov't Code § 12923; N.Y. Exec. Law § 296. 
69 Cal. Gov't Code § 12923. 
70 Id. 
71 Id. 
approach adopts the reasoning proposed by Justice Ginsburg in her Harris concurrence, as it 
involves an objective inquiry into whether a reasonable person would be injured by the altered 
working conditions.72 According to the legislature, the purpose of these new laws is “to provide 
all Californians with an equal opportunity to succeed in the workplace and should be applied 
accordingly by the courts.” 73  The legislature rejected the reasoning portrayed in Brooks v. City 
of San Mateo,  the previously controlling approach of the Ninth Circuit,74  dictating that the 
opinion shall no longer be used to determine what kind of conduct is sufficiently severe or 
pervasive to constitute an actionable claim.75 
While these reforms appear optimal on paper, they have not been effectively 
implemented, as California courts have not only retained the severe or pervasive standard, but 
also disregarded the enhanced protections Section 12923 provides.76  For example, in Jackson v. 
Pepperdine Univ., the appellant asserted that the respondent made two highly offensive remarks 
that “were sufficiently severe to have had such an effect on a reasonable woman in her 
position.”77 The court upheld the trial court’s ruling and applied the incorrect “severe or 
pervasive” standard, holding that both before and after the enactment of Section 12923, “the 
totality of the circumstances Jackson alleged do not reflect conduct sufficiently severe to 
constitute actionable sexual harassment.”78 
 
72 Id.  
73 Id. 
74 229 F.3d 917 at 926 (“Utilizing the Harris factors of frequency, severity and intensity of interference with 
working conditions, we cannot say that a reasonable woman in Brooks's position would consider the terms and 
conditions of her employment altered by Selvaggio's actions.”). 
75 Id.; see also Cal Gov Code § 12923. 
76 See Jackson v. Pepperdine Univ., No. B296411, 2020 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 5719, at *2 (Sep. 1, 2020 ); see 
also Mizrahi, supra note 14. 
77 2020 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 5719, at *2. 
78 Id. 
However, case law in New York following an amendment to their Human Rights Law 
fared differently.79 On August 12, 2019, Governor Cuomo signed into law SB 6577, which 
amended the New York State Human Rights Law by creating new protections enhancing existing 
protections against sexual harassment.80  The new law completely discarded the "severe or 
pervasive" requirement to establish a claim of sexual harassment based upon a hostile 
environment.81  Prior to the amendment, a plaintiff claiming a hostile work environment based 
on discrimination in violation of the NYSHRL had to show that the workplace was “permeated 
with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to 
alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive working environment.”82  
Now, under New York law, that standard does not apply, and it is the employer who must prove 
that a "reasonable victim" would view the conduct in question as no more than "petty slights or 
trivial inconveniences."83  The law directs courts to construe the NYSHRL liberally, like its New 
York City counterpart,84 “regardless of whether federal civil rights laws including those laws 
with provisions worded comparably to the provisions of [the NYSHRL] have been so 
construed."85 This legislation transformed sexual harassment law in the state of New York 
because now any unwanted sexual or gender-based harassment, including seemingly isolated 
comments, jokes, or gestures, may be unlawful.86 
The monumental impact of New York’s change was evident in Petrilli v. Bd. of Educ. of 
the E. Rochester Union Free Sch. Dist, where a plaintiff claimed that she was offended by her 
 
79 See S.B. 6577, 2019-2020 Reg. Sessions (N.Y. 2019), https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/bills/2019/s6577. 
80 Id. 
81 Russell Penzer, New York Breaks from Federal Sexual Harassment Standards, N.Y.L.J (Oct. 4, 2019). 
82 Reichman v. City of N.Y., 2020 NY Slip Op 00631, ¶ 2, 179 A.D.3d 1115, 1118  (App. Div. 2nd Dept.). 
83 Penzer, supra note 81. 
84 N.Y Admin. Code § 8-101. 
85 N.Y. Exec. Law § 300.  
86 Penzer, supra note 81.  
colleague’s vulgar behavior and language, which created a hostile work environment.87  The 
court dismissed her claim under the previous standard, however addressed the amendments to the 
standard in a footnote, highlighting that had the new Human Rights Law been enacted at the time 
of the heinous conduct, plaintiff’s claim would have been actionable. 88  Petrilli illustrates the 
benefits of disregarding the severity/pervasiveness of conduct, as improper conduct can no 
longer be referred to as inconsequential rudeness. However, it is unclear how the new standard 
will play out, as like in the California opinions, few courts have applied the lower standard to 
novel case law. 
Although states can enact legislation that is more restrictive than federal statutes, some 
experts propose that weakening the substantive legal standard will not affect  the outcome of 
many cases because the severe or pervasive standard can be avoided by plaintiff’s including 
other state law claims in their pleadings.89  Additionally, state modifications may be inefficient in 
providing recourse for victims of sexual harassment, as courts seem to cling to old norms and 
misapply, or sometimes completely disregard, enhanced protections. The next section will 
address the gaps in protections for victims and proposes that a new standard that can be more 
steadily applied may be the best way to promote uniformity among the courts in the context of 
sexual harassment. The enactment of the “BE HEARD” act, in conjunction with state 
 
87 2019 NY Slip Op 52182(U), ¶ 3, 129 N.Y.S.3d 241, 245 (Sup. Ct.). 
88 Id. at 241 (“Nor does the frequency of the vulgar and lewd references, even if directed at the plaintiff on account 
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ASSOCIATION (2020), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/publications/litigation-news/featured-
articles/2020/new-state-laws-expand-workplace-protections-sexual-harassment-victims/ (“pleading state law claims 
for assault, battery, negligent hiring, and negligent supervision.”). 
modifications to their substantive standards in the realm of sexual harassment law, will provide 
this solution.  
III. ANALYSIS 
The “severe or pervasive” standard is outdated and underinclusive because courts are  
unwilling to recognize victims’ injuries. The disparity in the case law is far too great under the 
current standard, and this gap in federal protections must be lessened.90  While the severe or 
pervasive standard may have worked under the principles of the last century, reasonableness 
standards are meant to update with the law, and cannot “entrench norms from another time.”91  
However, despite the increased intolerance of sexual misconduct and harassment in light of 
#MeToo, many courts have failed to update their understandings of these types of claims and 
instead rely on outdated standards and norms that focus on patriarchal notions and protecting 
employers, instead of on protecting victims.92 Accordingly, the “BE HEARD” Act should be 
adopted because it provides for a national solution that is more reflective of current 
understandings and rejections of sexual harassment claims. 
The case law governing hostile work environment claims is blatantly inconsistent.93  
Judges often interpret the standard as “severe and pervasive”, which “elevates the severity of the 
conduct to a really unconscionable level” when the Supreme Court intended the standard to be 
 
90  Kenneth R. Davis, Strong Medicine: Fighting the Sexual Harassment Pandemic , 79 OHIO ST. L.J. 1057, 1103 
(2018) (the standard needs to be low to condemn behavior that would be highly offensive to unbiased observers 
without overreach. “The occasional salacious joke, insult, or provocative remark may be boorish, but most 
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91 Joan C. Williams et al, What's Reasonable Now? Sexual Harassment Law After the Norm Cascade , 2019 MICH. 
ST. L. REV. 139, 154 (2019).  
92 See generally Williams et al., supra note 91, at 151-54. 
93 See Back, supra note 9, at 3 (“Courts repeatedly note the difficulty of assessing whether harassing conduct is 
sufficiently severe or pervasive under Harris to amount to a Title VII violation .”).  
disjunctive.94 For example, in Hannigan-Haas v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., the senior vice 
president of plaintiff’s employer asked her to accompany him to his office where he later 
sexually assaulted her, only stopping when the plaintiff was able to break free and run from the 
room.95  While this sexual assault was rendered sufficiently severe, the United States District 
Court for the Northern District of Illinois held that it nevertheless wasn’t enough to constitute 
sexual harassment because it only occurred once, and therefore was not “pervasive” enough to 
meet the standard.96 This was clear misuse of an already impenetrable standard. 
 In an attempt to avoid further misapplication, the Seventh Circuit restated the Meritor 
standard in Cerros v. Steel Techs., Inc, in 2005, clarifying that “conduct that 
is either pervasive or severe may give rise to a hostile work environment."97  Yet,  other 
jurisdictions continue to apply the wrong standard, often finding very offensive conduct “that 
would amount to sexual assault under criminal statutes” not actionable because it is insufficiently 
severe or pervasive.”98  Many courts struggle to determine what qualifies as sufficiently severe 
or pervasive conduct. While the Supreme Court in Harris articulated factors for use in 
determining whether a work environment is hostile, courts often misapply these factors by 
overweighing them and inconsistently interpreting what is offensive enough.99   
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95 See No. 95 C 7408, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16416 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 1, 1996). 
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Harris Factors). 
97 398 F.3d 944, 950 (7th Cir. 2005).  
98 Johnson, supra note 19, at 112. 
99 See Harris, 510 U.S at 23 (the Supreme Court articulated several non-exclusive factors for use in determining 
whether a work environment is unlawfully hostile or abusive including: the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; 
its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it 
unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance.  The Court clarified that the presence or absence of 
any of these factors was not determinative).  
For example, in Hill-Dyson v. City of Chicago, the Seventh Circuit held that plaintiff's 
allegations that a supervisor rubbed her back, squeezed her shoulder and stared at her chest 
during a uniform inspection while telling her to raise her arms and open her blazer were isolated 
incidents that, even when taken together, did not create a hostile work environment.100  Yet, in 
EEOC. v. Management Hospitality of Racine, Inc, the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Wisconsin held that three instances of sexual harassment by a supervisor—
telling her that he thought she was "kinky" and liked it "rough," propositioned her for sex, and 
"slap groped" her buttocks—was sufficiently pervasive to support a claim.101 The harassment 
that took place in Hill-Dyson and Management Hospitality is eerily similar, both demonstrating 
separate incidents of offensive, egregious conduct, and yet the courts reached different results.102 
These inconsistencies exemplify the need for a more encompassing federal standard that 
proposes clear guidelines for judges to utilize when assessing hostile work environment claims to 
promote uniformity in factually analogous scenarios.103  
However, many critics say that a more inclusive national standard may negatively affect 
victims because men, who are often perceived as harassers, will shy away from interactions with 
women out of fear of allegations.104 Studies reflect that male behavior and interactions with the 
opposite sex changed in light of the #MeToo movement, and in turn women’s careers are 
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TIMES, July 1, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/01/upshot/members-of-the-opposite-sex-at-work-gender-
study.html. 
stagnant.105  Men are less willing to mentor women, therefore women’s careers are adversely 
effected because workers with mentors are more likely to be promoted.106  Such negative effects 
on women’s careers are present in most professions, including the legal profession, where 
differential treatment of female associates is prevalent because the number of male partners and 
potential mentors exceeds the number of female partners.107  Therefore, some propose that the 
deprivation of one-on-one interactions with superiors has left women with no room for 
advancement because they are unable to demonstrate that they are qualified and deserving of 
promotions and higher positions.108 
Additional evidence further suggests that the stagnancy of women’s careers correlates 
with male superior’s fear of interaction with women. For example, a study conducted by Ann 
McGinley referenced a series of hypotheticals that she proposed to participants, among which 
was the situation of a male partner who, when traveling to take depositions, regularly went to 
dinner before the depositions with male associates to discuss strategy but refused to go with 
female associates because of his fear of sexual harassment accusations.109  This is just one 
hypothetical that reflects the unforgiving perception that exchanges with females are dangerous. 
110 Studies show that senior level male managers are: 
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107 McGinley, supra note 105 at 1398. 
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and promotions).  
109 McGinley, supra note 105, at 1399.  
110 McGinley, supra note 105, at 1399 (“women (especially younger ones) are dangerous temptresses or liars (or 
both). A complementary stereotype is that men cannot control their sexual urges when faced with temptation.”).  
twelve times more likely to hesitate before having a one-on-one meeting with a female 
junior colleague than with a male junior colleague, nine times more likely to hesitate 
before traveling for work with a female junior colleague than with a male junior 
colleague, and six times more likely to hesitate before having a work dinner with a 
female junior colleague than with a male junior colleague.111 
The media fuels reservations surrounding mentoring women.112  In fact, a large percentage of 
opinion pieces published since #MeToo counsel men not to mentor younger women out of 
concern of accusations of sexual harassment.113  Many men in today’s workplace are afraid of 
being pegged a harasser, and are willing to reduce interaction with women to avoid the danger of 
being labeled as such. Fueled by this fear, 60% of Male managers in the United States say that 
they are uncomfortable engaging in common workplace interactions with women, including 
mentoring, socializing, and having one-on-one meetings.114 
However, there is also a common contrary belief that the consequences of bringing 
victim’s stories to light are more damaging to victims’ careers than harassers’ careers, and that 
the consequences of reporting actually last longer for victims than harassers.115  In response to 
#MeToo’s powerful impact, opponents circulated #HimToo to introduce accused men as 
victims, using the same power-in-numbers technique to belittle the #MeToo movement.”116 
Many men act differently out of fear of false reporting, but the reality is that women are often 
hesitant to report sexual misconduct out of fear of retaliation and mistreatment.117  
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Despite a lack of evidence to support the fear of false claims of sexual misconduct, men, 
particularly those in leadership positions in the United States, are increasingly concerned about 
the possibility of false accusations of sexual harassment by female subordinates.118 Former 
President Trump perpetrated the myth of false reporting throughout his term, once stating that "it 
is a very scary time for young men in America, where you can be guilty of something you may 
not be guilty of."119  During a news conference in New York, Trump fueled the resistance against 
#MeToo, saying that "somebody could come and say 30 years ago, 25 years ago, 10 years ago, 
five years ago, he did a horrible thing to me.  He did this, he did that, he did that and, honestly, 
it's a very dangerous period in our country."120  In fact, Trump has often suggested that courts 
should be skeptical of women’s complaints, and frequently dismisses his own impropriety as 
inconsequential “locker room talk.”121  The twenty six women that spoke out against Trump 
were ridiculed, mocked and demeaned, and their accusations were dismissed as ploys for 
attention.122  The experiences of those who reported Trump’s misconduct prove that the stakes 
for reporting sexual misconduct are high, thus lowering the threshold is not going to hurt men 
because even under the current high standard, few victims seek recourse.  
Additionally, some business groups say that removing the "severe or pervasive" standard 
would “unnecessarily” ramp up the volume of legal cases and “diminish real complaints of 
harassment.”123 Many advocate for a more interventionist approach that involves talking to the 
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offender and correcting behavior rather than relying on lawsuits.124  Others fear that lowering the 
standard will transform Title VII into a general civility code.125 However, very few victims of 
sexual harassment actually take formal action, as approximately 90% of individuals who say that 
they have experienced sexual harassment never took formal action or reported the misconduct.126 
Moreover, as the facts in Harris suggest, confronting a harasser may not stunt the behavior.127  
If the standard is lowered, victims that were previously unable to have their claims heard 
will have their day in court.128  There have been many instances of sexual harassment that have 
been deemed as not actionable because of the preclusive nature of the severe or pervasive 
standard.129  For example, in Brooks, Patricia Brooks was sexually harassed during her evening 
shift.130  While performing her job duties, her supervisor approached her and “placed his hand on 
her stomach and commented on its softness and sexiness.”131  Despite Brooks’ objections, the 
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130 Brooks, 229 F.3d at 921-22. 
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supervisor continued to forcefully touch her, “boxing her in against the communications console 
as she was taking another 911 call.”132  He forced his hand underneath her sweater and bra.133  
Brook’s removed the supervisors hand and continued to shut him down, and was only able to 
stop the supervisor upon the arrival of another dispatcher.134  Brooks reported the incident 
immediately, and the supervisor was removed from his position.135  Upon reporting, it was 
established that the supervisor was a repeated offender, as many other female dispatchers had 
been subjected to similar treatment, but had not reported the conduct.136  Brooks brought this 
claim for hostile work environment harassment, as she had trouble recovering from the incident 
and sought psychological treatment.137  Following a six month leave of absence, Brooks returned 
to work and was ostracized and mistreated by male supervisors.138  Accordingly, Brooks was 
essentially forced to quit her job and never returned.139 
The District Court held that the conduct was “not severe enough to give rise to a hostile 
work environment claim”, and Brooks appealed.140  The Ninth Circuit affirmed, determining that 
because Brooks could only rely on the single instance of sexual harassment in support of her 
hostile work environment claim, the misconduct was not severe enough to be actionable.141 In 
rendering its decision, the court referred to the standard set out in Harris, writing that “Brooks 
must show that her ‘workplace [was] permeated with discriminatory intimidation . . . that [was] 
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working environment.’"142  Though the court reasoned that Brooks asserted sufficient facts to 
support the subjective prong of the hostile work environment analysis, the court held that the 
supervisors conduct did not satisfy the objectively reasonable analysis.143  In its reasoning, the 
court referred to other cases decided under the standard and recognized that physical injuries 
resulting from a single incident may be sufficient enough to be severe, but because Brooks only 
suffered psychological injury, this incident could not have sufficiently permeated Brook’s 
workplace to support her claim.144 The court reaffirmed the standard set out in Meritor, writing 
that “an isolated incident of harassment by a co-worker will rarely (if ever) give rise to a 
reasonable fear that sexual harassment has become a permanent feature of the employment 
relationship.”145 
The decision in Brooks demonstrates the judiciary’s inability to adequately recognize 
conduct as severe enough to meet the threshold. Similarly, other cases illustrate this difficulty 
establishing that harassment is adequately pervasive to support a cause of action.146  For 
example, the Northern District of Alabama did not consider twenty incidents of harassment by 
supervisor over a year and a half period to be pervasive enough to support a claim, despite the 
harasser making comments about the employee’s buttocks, making sexual jokes, telling her that 
he would be her “sugar daddy”, and suggesting that other workers would want to see her “down 
on all fours.147  There, the court improperly suggested that the harassment would have had to 
occur daily to meet the governing standard, meaning that even repetitive harassment is often 
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dismissed as not actionable.  Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit in Mitchell v. Pope dismissed a 
supervisors behavior as insufficiently “severe” to attach liability because of the infrequency of 
the conduct.148  Plaintiff pointed to sixteen specific instances of offensive conduct by her 
supervisor that occurred throughout her four years of employment.149  Though most incidents 
involved "offensive utterances," the supervisor touched her (or attempted to touch her) on 
multiple occasions, including trying to kiss her, lifting her, and rubbing up against her.150  The 
court took a dismissive, employer-friendly view of the conduct,  discounting the superior’s 
action as horseplay that couldn’t qualify as sexual harassment because “some was not sex-
based”.151  Notably, this case is explicitly referenced in the “BE HEARD” act in a section 
describing erroneous analysis of the severe or pervasive standard, supporting that often conduct 
that meets the high severe or pervasive standard is discounted or excused despite the offensive 
nature of the conduct.152   
The court’s dismissive reasoning in the referenced cases is reflective of the need for a 
less stringent standard for assessing what actually makes a work experience harmful to workers, 
mostly women, who are harassed.153  The severe or pervasive standard is a product of judicial 
interpretation, and is not found in Title VII. 154  While it could be said that Title VII was 
intentionally left broad to allow for judicial interpretation, it is clear that divergent 
understandings and inconsistent applications of the standard have shut out an enormous class of 
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victims from legal recognition and redress.155  For example, in Brooks, Brooks reported her 
traumatizing assault, something that many women who were also assaulted by the same 
supervisor could not do.156  Had a more victim-friendly standard been implemented, the court in 
cases like Brooks may have ruled differently. It is possible that the reasoning proposed in Justice 
Ginsburg’s concurrence in Harris reflects a better standard. 157  Justice Ginsburg did not perceive 
her view as inconsistent with the majority opinion, but instead proposed a lower threshold to 
allow more victims, regardless of whether the conduct satisfies the Harris factors158, to come 
forward.159 
A. The Solution: “Be HEARD”  
Since the severe or pervasive standard, though uniform, has been faulty in its application, 
binding legislation that explicitly lays out an applicable standard with guidelines may lead to 
more consistent rulings in sexual harassment cases.  The “BE HEARD” act was introduced in 
Congress on April 9, 2019.160  The path to equality in the workplace requires a solution that 
adequately addresses the widespread presence of sexual harassment.  Very few states outside 
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New York and California have made efforts to employ additional protections, most of which 
were liberal, progressive (“blue”) states such as Maryland, Illinois, and Vermont.161  
Accordingly, a federal solution that revises the severe or pervasive standard is necessary. While 
it is unlikely that “BE HEARD” will pass in the 117th United States Congress, addressing our 
sexual harassment epidemic must remain an urgent priority and should be relentlessly sought as a 
nonpartisan effort to deliver basic constitutional rights.162  The “BE HEARD” act offers a 
detailed roadmap for judges and employers to follow in identifying conduct that constitutes 
unlawful harassment. The bill provides proper recourse for victims by supplying a template to 
the federal courts to analyze harassment, as courts have too often excused abusive conduct in the 
workplace, dissuading other from seeking legal redress.163 
The findings in the bill support that harassment is a “persistent and significant problem in 
the workplace in the United States[,]” and that the purpose of congress’ enactment of Title VII 
was to provide broad protections from bias in the workplace.164  The bill clarifies the revised 
threshold for hostile work environment claims, disregarding the “severe or pervasive” standard 
and instead only requiring that the conduct “ha[ve] the purpose or effect of unreasonably 
interfering with an individual’s work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or 
offensive working environment.”165  The act also promotes consistency in its application, 
elaborating on the factors that courts should consider on a case-by-case basis in order to avoid 
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misapplication and emphasis on solely the severity or pervasiveness of the conduct.166  Some of 
the guidelines listed by the act include: (1) that the determination be made based off the record in 
its entirety;167 and that (2) incidents of harassment be considered in the aggregate, rather than in 
isolation.168  The act also specifies factors for courts to consider whether conduct constitutes 
workplace harassment are neither exhaustive nor determinative.169  Such factors include: (i) The 
frequency of the conduct; (ii) The duration of the conduct; (iii) The location where the conduct 
occurred; (iv) The number of individuals engaged in the conduct.; (v) The nature of the conduct, 
which may include physical, verbal, pictorial, or visual conduct, and conduct that occurs in 
person or is transmitted, such as electronically; (vi) Whether the conduct is threatening; (vii) Any 
power differential between the alleged harasser and the person allegedly harassed; and (viii) Any 
use of epithets, slurs, or other conduct that is humiliating or degrading.170  Codification of these 
factors will allow for more thorough and consistent consideration of Hostile Work Environment 
claims.  
CONCLUSION 
 A change to the current federal standard governing sexual harassment law is necessary 
in order to penalize harassers, who continue to set women’s careers back through their 
traumatizing conduct. Since its inception, the severe or pervasive standard has promoted 
inconsistency in its application. Judges have failed to hold harassers accountable for 
dehumanizing conduct, leaving victims without a proper remedy. The modifications made by 
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harassment”). 
168 H.R. 2148, 116 th Cong. § 204(c)(3)(B) (2019).  
169 H.R. 2148, 116 th Cong. § 204(c)(3)(C) (2019). 
170 H.R. 2148, 116 th Cong. § 204(c)(3)(C) (2019). 
states such as New York and California have proven that a lower threshold to bring an actionable 
claim is appropriate. Accordingly, the “severe or pervasive” standard purported in Meritor must 
be abandoned in light of #metoo in order to provide protections for victims. Victims are being 
harmed by the high Meritor standard, and the enactment of the “BE HEARD” act will provide 
relief for victims of sexual harassment by encompassing a wider range of harmful conduct.   
 
